“You can’t land where we’re at anymore.” Inside the Knowles fire that killed 4 firefighters.
Less than an hour before she would die huddled in a flimsy shelter as fire roared around her and her fellow crew members, firefighter Emily Barker texted her superintendent a photo of a mandarin-colored sky — a dangerously beautiful backdrop to dark pinyon trees and gray-green sagebrush. Her accompanying message read, “It looks like sunset, but it’s 2:30 in the afternoon.”
The photo has a soft beauty, and it holds a stark warning.
Fierce winds were whipping up fires all over the place in remote areas west of Grand Junction on June 27. At least 10 blazes had been sparked by lightning in the previous days. Experienced pilots were struggling to maneuver their planes and helicopters through blinding columns of smoke and dangerous wind gusts. Some said they flew that day through some of the worst conditions they had ever encountered.
On the ground, fire managers were struggling to communicate with inadequate radios and with changing jurisdictions and too few personnel. Firefighters were having to strap their helmets down to keep the winds from whipping them off their heads. Forecast communications about the wild weather were very patchy.
Fire supervisors hadn’t been able to track exactly where crews were on the ground or know that one crew was directly in the path of a growing fire.
There was no hint of all that chaos except for the odd-colored sky in Barker’s photo. Her crew had been busy since morning doing the job wildland firefighters do: wielding tools in patchy knee-high flames among smoldering trees to keep the Knowles fire from burning out-of-control. It was the largest fire in Colorado at the time because it had merged with two other fires to cover more than 28,000 acres.
While they worked, pilots had spotted smoke from a new fire — a kidney-bean-shaped conflagration along the Dolores River that was heading north. The fire that came to be known as the Snyder blaze was reported to be 7 or 8 miles away. That is considered a safe distance for firefighters — on a normal day.
Barker, the squad leader for the Rifle Helitack team, and her four crew members had no way to tell that fire was actually barreling down on them from behind a large rock outcrop that blocked their view.
The crew didn’t know that some aircraft had been grounded by the turbulent conditions or that another Helitack crew from the Snyder fire had been picked up an hour earlier.
A federal investigation report released late last week called that lack of facts “incomplete situational awareness.”
Barker’s texts with her superintendent were the last calm communication in a maelstrom of mixed messages, crossed signals and thwarted aerial surveillance on a day when drought and wind stoked lightning sparked fires across western Colorado and eastern Utah, thrusting fire managers into a deadly game of whack-a-mole.

The report refers to those pressures as “extreme operational tempo.”
When Barker’s superintendent received her texted photo, he asked if she and her crew were ready to leave the fire. She had 19 years of firefighting experience. She looked around and replied that they had more work to do. They were comfortable with their safety.
The details of those final hours and minutes, along with the sometimes-confusing daylong actions of fire officials, fill the 95 pages of the Knowles Fire Serious Accident Investigation. The report is the newly created U.S. Wildland Fire Service agency’s attempt to answer — some family members say obfuscate — why four firefighters died in a remote, barren wilderness area 12 miles from the nearest structures.
“This was a no man’s land with no values at risk,” Lisa Hutcherson, the mother of fire victim Nick Hutcherson, wrote in an email to The Sun. “Our son’s courage should never have been used to shield the decisions that left him trapped.”
The report states that the decision to put the firefighters where they were was based on “ecological mandates.” If the fire had been left to burn, the Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness could have been invaded by cheatgrass post-fire, a non-native wild grass that could have left the area vulnerable to future wildfires. The report also cited the priority of protecting habitat for the Gunnison sage-grouse.

The firefighters were positioned west of a few scattered ranch buildings and the small Glade Park community. There is also heavy recreational use of some adjacent areas.
The account of why fire managers decided to attack the fire is quickly overshadowed by the details of how many things went wrong that day — both natural and human-caused. The confusion of so many details tied to so many different agencies, throws a thick blanket of facts over the basic “why” that still haunts family members of the victims, who also included Sydney Watson and Nathan Matthews.
The only one of the crew members to survive is referred to as “Firefighter Five” throughout the report. The privacy of the firefighter, who is still being treated for injuries, is being tightly protected. The report does not even reveal a gender.
The question of “why” is unanswered
But it is Firefighter Five’s account that turns a bureaucratic report into a frightening account of survival. The firefighter was able to fill in the somber details of what happened between Barker’s texted photo and an inferno that engulfed a small band of humans.
Firefighter Five’s account can’t answer the “why,” but it gives great insight into the “how.”
Barker had several more communications with superintendents and a helicopter pilot before the circumstances turned deadly.
A few minutes before 3 p.m., a superintendent who apparently knew more about the danger than the firefighters in the field, called Barker to let her know a helicopter was being sent to extract all five firefighters. They were told to leave their gear behind to lighten the load.
“Just get in,” the superintendent ordered.
“We’re gonna leave,” Barker told her team as she prepared them to hike to their drop-off point. They checked on their way back to make sure the fire lines they had built earlier were secure.
Nick Hutcherson then called the fire dispatch center to give an update on the fire. The response was, “You don’t need to update us. Just get out of there.”

By 3:02 p.m., a helicopter had fueled up and was taking to the air at a staging center that had been set up at the Rabbit Valley Recreation Area not far from the fires. The pilot radioed what he thought was the Knowles team to update them, but because of radio problems that had dogged the myriad agencies all day, it turned out he was talking to a different crew 30 miles away from the trapped team.
The Knowles crew had started making its way to the helispot, but the smoke was so thick by the time they neared the area that they had to use GPS to try to pinpoint the landing location. They started cutting trees to create a new helispot before a window of visibility briefly opened in the swirling smoke. They spotted the landing site where they had left their gear that morning. It was about 50 feet away.
They hurried to the helispot through the dead and downed trees that surrounded it in every direction.
Hutcherson picked up a call from a pilot and told him, “I’m not sure you can land where you landed before.”
The crew could hear the chop of the rotors above, but in the thick smoke they couldn’t even see the craft. The helicopter also couldn’t see them through smoke so thick it made it impossible to land. They firefighters tried to flash strobe lights to show the pilot where they were.
They each grabbed a few small items, like wallets, from their gear.
“The winds were squirrely,” Firefighter Five recalled in the report. “You could feel the heat all of a sudden, but not enough to be painful yet.”
At about 3:19 p.m., Barker radioed the pilot to say, “OK, I think you can still land.” She followed that seconds later with, “You can’t land where we’re at anymore.”
The communication went dead. The pilot tried to call her back several times but there was no response.
On the ground, Barker had given her team a command that wildland firefighters dread: “That’s it. We gotta pull shelter.”
Three of the crew quickly pulled their shelters from pouches on the bottom of their flight bags. The single-person, capsule-shaped shelters are made of silica, fiberglass, and a reflecting layer of aluminum foil that will melt if temperatures reach about 1,200 degrees F. They are designed to be a last-resort measure in burnovers.
Firefighter Five struggled to get the shelter out of its hardshell case.
“Here, take mine,” Barker said, just as Firefighter Five was able to free theirs.
Barker’s next command was to stay together and to “put your feet towards the fire” that was bearing down from the southwest.
The fire was on top of them in seconds. Beyond scrambling under the shelters, none of them had time to prepare for the burnover
“It was fuzzy. It all felt like a dream,” Firefighter Five said of being under the shelter.

Firefighter Five did what wildland firefighters are taught and quickly dug a depression in the dirt to breathe into. The firefighter thought the shelter was going to blow away in the severe, fire-whipped winds, but anchored the handles on each end with their arms and legs.
“It was hot as hell,” Firefighter Five said.
The report estimated that temperatures around the shelters were 750 to 980 degrees F with some peaks over 1,200 degrees.
Firefighter Five waited out the fire while resisting the urge to climb out of the shelter when the heat became unbearable. Wildland firefighters are also taught that they will likely have the urge to escape shelters when they feel as if they’re in super-heated ovens, but they must stay put.
All the firefighters heeded that directive.
When the sky began to lighten, Firefighter Five checked the time and found that 48 minutes had passed since Barker had given the command to deploy the shelters. Firefighter Five’s first attempt to peek out of the shelter was met with a blast of searing hot air. Five closed the gap and stayed put. The firefighter attempted to use a radio, but it wouldn’t work.
Firefighter Five and Matthews eventually were able to yell to each other from their shelters so they knew that at least two of them had survived.

Throughout the burnover, a superintendent had been trying repeatedly to call members of the crew but was unable to get through until 3:44 p.m. when Matthews answered his cellphone from under his shelter.
The superintendent immediately called for paramedics.
About two and a half hours after the entrapment began, one of several helicopters that had been trying to access the site was able to land. A second helicopter took off headed to the firefighters from Rabbit Valley with medical personnel and medical devices.
When the first helicopter hovered over the site, the pilot and personnel could see a wasteland of burned tree stumps below. Five shelters were laid out like dominoes in the shape of a half moon on the spot where the firefighters had been dropped off that morning. A hand holding a strobe was sticking out of Firefighter Five’s shelter.
That gave the pilot hope.
“Oh good, they’re fine,” he thought.
When the helicopter landed, Firefighter Five was able to walk out of a shelter to the aircraft. Matthews “bear crawled” towards the helicopter but had to be carried most of the way.
A second helicopter flew in after Firefighter Five and Matthews were rescued. One of the medical personnel on that chopper checked the three crew members who hadn’t moved from under their shelters. They had no pulses.
The news that firefighters had been lost set off a flurry of activity. Officials poured into the command center at the Grand Junction airport and to the staging site at Rabbit Valley. All firefighting activities on all fires were halted.
It would take until 6 a.m. the next morning before the three bodies could be retrieved from the remote site and flown to the Grand Junction Regional Airport where dozens of firefighting and law enforcement personnel were lining a road to pay their respects.

Meanwhile, Matthews and Firefighter Five had been taken to Intermountain Health St. Mary’s Regional Hospital in Grand Junction. They were then flown to the UCHealth Burn and Frostbite Center in Denver.
The Federal Wildland Fire Service report reveals that the three deceased firefighters died from suffocation caused by damage to their lungs. That same damage would prove deadly for Matthews 28 days later, when he was being treated in a Denver hospital.
Firefighter Five’s injuries were not detailed. The report only stated that Firefighter Five is still recovering.
In the frantic effort to get into the shelter, Firefighter Five had not been able to maneuver the shelter enough so that their feet were aimed at the fire. Five’s worst burn injuries were on the right side that had been angled towards the oncoming fire. The firefighter’s fireproof shirt sleeves were rolled up so some of the worst burns were to the forearms. The heavy-duty gloves every firefighter carries were in a pocket of the firefighter’s standard-issue cargo pants.

The investigative report states up front that its purpose is to understand what happened and to use that understanding to avoid future tragedies.
The setting and weather were cited as major contributors.
Cheatgrass is highly flammable. So are sagebrush, pinyon pine and juniper trees that have been turned to tinder by drought. The previous winter had been one of the 10 driest winters since 1895. The report noted that the summer was the hottest in 130 years. The extreme drought that had been declared for the area in spring stopped any of the usual prescribed burning in the area.
The dramatic mesas and canyons in that area create microclimates, so there wasn’t a good understanding of how fires might move, especially on a day when winds called “squirrely” and “relentless” by pilots, were whipping up to 50 mph gusts.
The fires also didn’t behave as expected that day.
They blew up and devoured the dry, withered landscape. Fires that had begun on 60 acres that morning had burned 28,000 acres by nightfall. The flames jumped over natural barriers such as rock outcrops that would normally stop them. In the report, firefighters said they had never seen that sort of fire behavior before.
Adding to the chaotic situation was disagreement — the report calls it “administrative friction” — over which agencies had jurisdiction when fires from two states merged. Fire names had changed. Communications were so clunky that some orders had to be manually transcribed onto paper. Mandated conference calls between fire managers ate up valuable time. There was no interagency resource tracking, so some incident commanders were unclear of the exact location of firefighters on the ground.
There was no continuous radio system so dispatchers had to repeatedly log in and out. Most firefighters and their superintendents had resorted to using cellphones because of what they called “jitters” on the radios. That created “unrecorded information silos.”
The confusion had begun months before, with a flurry of firefighting management changes. Dispatch centers had been moved in Utah from Moab 217 miles to Vernal. Resources in the dispatch centers were stretched too thin. Positions were unfilled. In an area of 10 million acres of difficult, varying terrain, full-time dispatch staffing had dropped as a new administration took cost-cutting measures.
The position of dispatch manager at the Grand Junction center had gone unfilled for three years. Too many dispatchers were not experienced. Many were still working on their qualifications.
String all those factors together and, as one fire boss said in the report about that Saturday morning in June, “it felt like chaos.” The report refers to the frustrating set of problems as “task saturation” — a point where the cognitive load is so complicated that coordination and communication breaks down.
Is full suppression the right policy?
U.S. Sen. John Hickenlooper, a Democrat, has said the report isn’t enough. He issued a statement last week calling for more accounting.
“Faster, hotter wildfires are our new normal. We need to adequately staff our wildfire response teams and question whether DOI’s full suppression strategy is the right policy,” Hickenlooper’s statement read.
The report doesn’t address Hickenlooper’s reference to the fact that the new Wildland Fire Agency’s directive is to suppress fires rather than letting some burn as they have in the past.
In all the chaos detailed in the report, the Hutcherson family still sees no clear answer as to why five firefighters were left to die, or nearly die, in a fire the Hutchersons say did not truly endanger anything.

The Knowles fire, which had merged with the Gore and Snyder fires that day, ultimately covered 28,264 acres. No structures or homes were burned, and there were no evacuations except for the rescue of 123 campers who had been boating on the Colorado River. There no injuries from the fire except to the firefighters.
Lisa Hutcherson has sifted through the facts in the report. And she isn’t satisfied that anyone has been held accountable.
“After hearing the investigators’ admissions and walking the site myself, I am convinced that failures by the duty officer and others responsible for overseeing this operation caused my son’s death,” Hutcherson wrote to The Sun. “I stood where Nick stood. I saw the terrain. I saw no viable way out on the ground. My son depended on the people responsible for tracking the fire threatening him and making the decisions needed to keep him safe. We want answers, and we want accountability.”
A lengthy investigative report, she said, did not give her that.
Type of Story: News
Based on facts, either observed and verified directly by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources.
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